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「サイコ･ナショナリズム」は、現在の中東地域において不安定要因を形成する主
要な要因であり、それは排他的な国民意識の核となる集団的自己意識の半ば意図
的に捏造された発明品である。本論は中東イスラーム世界における哲学的議論の
豊かな蓄積―イブン･ハルドゥーンの政治学的･社会学的考察を含む―の上に、近
年盛んに行われているアイデンティティー政治学の宗派主義･部族主義的な分析
枠組みの脱構築を意図している。本論ではまずアラブ世界およびイラン世界にお
ける「想像的共同体」の具体的な構成要素に検討を加えたうえ、とりわけ中東地域
においては人間集団間の長期的な混交と相互依存構築という歴史的な経験を踏ま
えた理性的な対話･交渉による関係の構築が地域的平和の実現のための不可欠
の要件であることを確認する。  
（翻訳・鈴木均） 
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“The Middle East” and its discontents 
 
The Middle East is an invention. It was the US American naval officer Alfred T. 
Mahan who popularised the term designating this area in West Asia and North Africa 
in an article published in the British National Review in 1902.  The geographical 
delimitation catered to the strategic interest of the British Empire and thus focused upon 
Aden, India and the Persian Gulf area. Thereafter, the term “Middle East” was used by 
the Times of London where part of Mahan’s article was published. Subsequently, 
Valentine Chirol, a Times correspondent, began publishing a series of articles dealing 
with the “Middle Eastern Question” centring around India as the strategic heartland of 
the British Empire. With shifting colonial and “strategic interests” the delineation of 
the “Middle East” changed as well: when Winston Churchill was British Colonial 
Minister the term referred to the area between the Bosporus and the borders of India 
and when the colonial focus shifted towards Egypt after the Second World War Egypt 
itself was considered to be the centre of the “Middle East”. The imagined borders of 
the region thus shifted with the strategic interests of external powers, i.e. Great Britain 
and after the Second World War until very recently, the United States.   
     Although the etymology of the term can be traced back even to antiquity when 
Roman historians referred to this so called “Middle East”, the current map of the region 
largely emerged out of the break-up of imperial structures, i.e. the Ottoman Empire and 
the Qajar Empire in Persia2.  The two pivotal nodal points that have been repeatedly 
referred to in analyses of the map we are dealing with and which remains largely 
unaltered until today are firstly the “Sykes-Picot zeitgeist”  in the beginning of the 20th 
century – the imperial “lines in the sand” drawn by European strategists which 
effectively divided the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire outside of the Arabian 
peninsula into areas of future British and French control or influence and partitioned 
the whole of Syria and Iraq and a large part of southern Turkey. France’s area 
corresponded to the future states of Syria and Lebanon and Britain’s area to Iraq and 
Transjordan. France achieved direct control of the Mediterranean coastal regions and 
Britain gained the provinces of Basra and Baghdad in today’s Iraq. In accordance with 
these rather arbitrary delineations, which are easily recognizable by the straight 
“pseudo-borderlines” between newly constituted entities such as Syria, Iraq or Jordan, 
the new “Middle East” was engineered. 
    The second event of historical importance is, of course, the Balfour Declaration 
of 1917 which refers to a letter from the United Kingdom's Foreign Secretary Arthur 
James Balfour to Baron Rothschild, a leader of the British-Jewish community, for 
transmission to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland. The letter was 
incorporated into the peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire and gave impetus to the 
creation of the state of Israel within the British mandate in Palestine. The analytical 
bottom line of the previous paragraphs is that the contemporary regional system, so 
Eurocentrically termed “the Middle East”, came about within a period of imperial 
hegemony which necessitated the invention of nation-state boundaries and their 
                                                        
2 For a deeper analysis of the term “Middle East” see Lorenzo Kamel, The Middle East from Empire to Sealed 
Identities, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019, pp. 31-33. 
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corresponding identities in a way that had never occurred before in that area of the 
world. This region was ordered for hundreds of years in accordance with confessional 
sovereignties and legitimacy steeped in religious thought systems: Sunni Islam in the 
Ottoman Empire, Shia Islam in Iran, at least since the Safavid Dynasty which was 
established in 1501. In the absence of organic nation-state structures “national identity” 
became a violently contested issue, as nationalism is always also dependent on the 
definition of self and other (foreign policy becomes central exactly because it regulates 
the relationship between the internal boundary and the external, the realm beyond the 
self).  
     The arbitrary creation of this “Middle East” constituted by imperial interest, 
rather than strategic viability, gave impetus to a “post-colonial” identity dilemma which 
haunts the region until today. Apart from the cases of Israel, Iran and Turkey where 
there was a better scope to delineate “the nation”, national identity was a scarce resource 
exactly because the Arab states that emerged out of the Ottoman Empire did not exist 
in this shape and form at any time in human history. Being Jordanian, Iraqi or Syrian 
had to be engineered and different types of “psycho-nationalisms” were created to that 
end3.  
     This post-colonial identity dilemma manifests itself in the repeated challenge 
to- and erosion of state sovereignties for instance by transnational ideologies: pan-
Arabism at the time of Nassir especially in the late 1950s and 1960s or pan-Islamism 
throughout the period after the ending of the caliphate in 1924. Some of the crises 
occurring in the region today, the implosion of Syria, the confessional and ethnic strife 
in Iraq or the Kurdish question for Turkey can be explained by this apparent inadequacy 
of the “nation-state” as we know it to institutionalise a national identity that is flexible 
enough to accommodate the widest constituencies in support of the legitimacy of the 
state. Psycho-nationalisms carried forward by the military strata of society which had 
the easiest recourse to weapons and to the budget of the state, were quite natural answers 
to the governance dilemma that was compounded if not constituted by the lack of an 
organically growing bureaucracy and institutional infrastructure that could carry the 
meaning of the nation in the first place. The Ba’thist states in Syria and Iraq or the deep 
state in Egypt are typical examples for a form of militarised governance that sheds its 
light onto the region until today. 
 
 
Psycho-nationalism defined 
 
I have argued that in the absence of institutional and administrative structures to govern, the 
post-colonial states of the Arab world, even after nominal independence in the 1950s, experimented 
with radical forms of nationalism that were ideological and not pluralistic. All governments use a 
range of national narratives imbued with emotional vigour and tantalising myths. The point is that 
in the familial language of (psycho-)nationalism, in the Arab world and elsewhere, the nation is 
routinely represented almost like an irresistible muse, a siren song with distinctly emotional 
                                                        
3 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Psycho-nationalism: Global Thought, Iranian Imaginations, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017. 
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undertones. “God bless America”, “Roma o’ Morte” as Italian psycho-nationalists proclaimed or 
Gamal Abdal Nassir’s repeated references to the greatness of the Arab nation – the target of such 
phrases is our state of mind and emotional habitat. My term psycho-nationalism derives from such 
psychological dynamics. Government, the media, social networking sites such as Twitter and 
Facebook, even popular culture in the form of soap operas, and music have emerged as the primary 
carriers of the symbols of this emotive discourse. The target of these subtle forms of political 
manipulation is our mind and our emotions. As such, psycho-nationalism has a cognitological effect.  
At the same time, the state hovers over a complex system in which psycho-nationalist 
narratives are moulded and implemented. Therefore, the state and its underbelly continues to be the 
primary harbinger of psycho-nationalism, primarily to legitimate its existence and the governmental 
forms of power projection that are in place to administer society. Hence it claims the 
Gewaltmonopol, defined by German sociologist Max Weber as the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical force within a given territory. So if “romantic” persuasion is not enough, if the siren 
song of the nation fails to entice, the nation-state can be enforced through violence, brute if 
necessary. You can be beaten into submission. There are important differences in the ways in which 
state violence is implemented against assertive dissenters, but governments routinely crush 
opposition in the name of the nation and in West Asia and North Africa such state violence has 
repeatedly been particularly excessive. In most countries of the “west”, this systematic power of the 
state is professionally and effectively exercised through the machinery of laws, norms and 
regulations. If these strategies are not enough to deter a revolt, the state in Europe and North America 
or Japan as well uses violence through its security forces, police, the military etc in order to defend 
the sovereignty of the state and its legitimacy to use force to that end. This latter form of state power 
is rather more prevalent in West Asia and North Africa as indicated, but it lingers behind the liberal 
façade of the state all over the world. Here, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben remains firmly 
within the Eurocentric universe in his empirical analyses, but his focus on the ‘state of exception’ 
is a good conceptual tool for understanding this violence of state sovereignty4.  The state allows 
itself to suppress. Thus, our lives are determined by this nation-state, whether we like it or not. From 
provisions for housing, university fees and food to war and peace, the nation-state continues to be a 
major factor in the lives of its citizens all over the world. In many ways the nation-state is more 
consequential in our lives than our parents. It ‘stalks’ us all the way to our living rooms, regulating 
everything from TV programmes to schooling issues. If this regulatory power, which always also 
includes surveillance, is not checked properly by civil society it threatens to turn into a form of 
arbitrary tyranny. A critical and educated civil society, then, is crucial for the survival of democracy 
and human rights. 
Therefore, this article takes seriously the power of the nation-state and modes of resistance to 
it with particular reference to some aspects of the Iranian and Arab political context. I will attempt 
to dislocate some of the debates on nationalism by investigating several ‘sites’ where ‘psycho-
nationalist’ dynamics appear. I will keep a close eye on ‘new’, avant-garde disciplines such as global 
thought, global history and comparative philosophies, and my evidence is primarily discussed in 
terms of concepts and political ideas, that is what I have called “psycho-nationalism in particular, 
and not so much in terms of empirical case studies which go beyond the confines of this analysis. 
There is controversy over the genealogy of nationalist thinking in Turkey, Israel, Iran and the 
Arab world in the scholarly literature. But in general, research in Europe and North America tends 
                                                        
4 See further Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
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to locate the emergence of ‘modern’ nationalism in the so called “west” in general and Europe in 
particular. In a rather more critical study of the subject matter, it is observed that the “west” saw 
nationalism as the ‘quintessential expression of inclusive tolerance. And this image was then often 
reinforced by a distinction between the West’s “civic” nationalism and illiberal “ethnic” 
nationalism’5.  The non-western world was juxtaposed to this self-image: ‘As the central organising 
principle of modern politics, nationalism was thus dichotomized between a noble Western invention 
and an ignoble non-Western imitation’6. 
While there is overlap due to the intense dialectic between “East” and “West” during the 
colonial period which created common Euro-Asian spaces, it is principally problematic to reduce 
the emergence of nationalism to European ideas. The concept of an organised community is central 
to the canons of eastern philosophy and its belles lettres. As an example of the latter, the Muslim 
philosopher Ibn Khaldun (d.1406) redefined “asabiyya” (social solidarity) from its pre-Islamic 
origin and Quranic legacy, in the first systematic sociological conceptualisation of a polity in his 
famous Muqaddimah (Introduction to history) as early as in 1377 AD. Ibn Khaldun followed the 
line of classical philosophers of the Muslim enlightenment, such as Abu Nasr Farabi, Razi, Ibn Sina 
(Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes). Like them, he was a distinctly original and cosmopolitan 
thinker for his period of time who took full advantage of the intellectual currents at this juncture of 
global history. Despite sloppy references to ‘negroes’ whom Ibn Khaldun deemed emotional and 
excitable and outdated links between environmental factors and levels of civilization that would be 
deemed racist in our current understanding, the core of Khaldun’s theories offers an inclusive 
conceptualisation of a social community based on research (however inadequate), rather than 
ideology or some aggressive imperial impulse. Khaldun was no Ernest Renan, who lent his limited 
knowledge about the region to French imperial strategists due to his conviction that the Orient had 
to be civilized. Ibn Khaldun was not an Occidentalist advocate of imperial subjugation of “the other”. 
This un-ideological approach of Khaldun comes out in his depiction of the non-Arab “other”, in this 
case the “Persians”: 
 
Thus the founders of grammar were Sibawaih and after him, al-Farisi and 
az-Zajjaj. All of them were of non-Arab (Persian) descent ... They invented rules 
of (Arabic) grammar ... great jurists were Persians ... only the Persians engaged in 
the task of preserving knowledge and writing systematic scholarly works. Thus the 
truth of the statement of the prophet becomes apparent, “If learning were 
suspended in the highest parts of heaven the Persians would attain it” ... The 
intellectual sciences were also the preserve of the Persians, left alone by the Arabs, 
who did not cultivate them ... as was the case with all crafts ... This situation 
continued in the cities as long as the Persians and Persian countries, Iraq, Khorasan 
and Transoxiana, retained their sedentary culture7. 
 
According to Khaldun, asabiyya (social solidarity) is an important factor in the cyclical rise 
and fall of civilisations and empires. Good governance enhances the social solidarity of the 
                                                        
5 Anthony W. Marx, Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 
p. vii 
6 Ibid., p. viii 
7 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, Vol. 1, translated by Franz Rosenthal, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 429–30. 
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community. Ideally, this socially constructed, politically administered consciousness would 
strengthen the community against external aggression and internal subversion. Here, Ibn Khaldun 
reveals himself as a theorist of state power. Comparable to other major political theorists of this 
period, Khaldun was concerned about the sovereignty of the state and its ability to govern society. 
The more the state is able to foster this sense of tribal community and kinship, he argued, the more 
likely it is to survive the vicissitudes of history. In a clear re-conceptualisation of Aristotle’s notion 
of koinonia, Khaldun emphasises the importance of social organisation (or ijtima) for this dialectical 
interaction between state and society. Human social organisation (al-ijtima al-insani) would be 
moulded by this ideal state in order to bring out the inherently civilised (madani) nature of the 
citizenry which indicates a rather positive anthropomorphic attitude, a positivism about humanity 
that permeates the writings of most classical Muslim philosophers. Khaldun wrote during a period 
of internal division of the Muslim empire partially caused by external threats. Whilst he had a clear 
interest in re-inscribing the authority of the state as a prophylaxis to internal divisions, he 
emphasised that no state can exist without fostering social cohesion amongst its citizenry. Hence, 
Khaldun shared this preoccupation about the social construction and maintenance of a community 
with western theorists of modernity, such as Emile Durkheim and Ernest Gellner. As one perceptive 
scholar demonstrates: Both Ibn Khaldun and Ernest Gellner have developed persuasive theoretical 
models that challenge such views and place group solidarity at the heart of long-term social change. 
… while for Ibn Khaldun the opulent urban lifestyles inevitably corrode social cohesion built in the 
shared ascetic living of tribal warriors, for Gellner modernity forges a new form of solidarity built 
around the promise of continuous economic growth, moral equality and cultural homogeneity 
among citizens inhabiting their own nation-state8. 
 
Even Ibn-Khaldun’s largely sober, contra-identitarian and research-led inquiries about world 
history were abused as tropes in psycho-nationalist narratives. As discussed above, Ibn Khaldun 
was a complex thinker, whose concepts were nuanced and balanced. He did not have a dichotomous 
notion of self and other, or an aggressive manifesto for political action or racist identities. And yet, 
he became a major reference point in the discourse of Arab psycho-nationalists, in particular at the 
beginning of the twentieth century when Arab (psycho)-nationalism was sponsored by British and 
French imperial strategists as a means to weaken the Ottoman Empire9. Imperial strategy, history 
demonstrates, is always also driven by a divide-and-rule dynamic that creates fissures in order to 
crush communities into manageable and governable smaller entities. Conversely, nationalism 
became a device to resist that effort. For instance, in the voluminous writings of Sati Al-Husri 
(1882–1962), the Ottoman-Syrian nationalist whose ideas became a pillar of Ba’thist ideology, Ibn 
Khaldun appears as a purveyor of Arab nationalism in order to create an artificial genealogy for his 
ideas of Arab unity or a potential pan-Arab super state. Al-Husri borrowed generously from the 
German romanticists, von Ranke and Fichte, in his reinvention of Khaldun as a pan-Arab nationalist. 
In typically psycho-nationalist fashion, he reconceptualised asabiyya as a spiritual bond among the 
members of a nation which is defined in terms of language and a shared memory or historical 
consciousness. According to this view, there is a metaphysical kinship between society and the 
nation. In opposition to his influential contemporary Taha Hussein, Sati al-Husri maintained that 
                                                        
8 Sinisa Malesevic, ‘Where Does Group Solidarity Come From? Gellner and Ibn Khaldun Revisited’, Thesis Eleven: 
Critical Theory and Historical Sociology, Vol. 129, No. 1, p. 97 (pp. 85–99). 
9 See further Nurullah Ardlc, ‘Genealogy or Asabiyya? Ibn Khaldun between Arab Nationalism and the Ottoman 
Caliphate’, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 71, No. 2 (2 October 2012), pp. 315–24. 
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Ibn Khaldun’s theories did not negate the concept of a “motherland”, but rather that the approach of 
Khaldun needed to be reinterpreted, as it was not “nationalistic” in the modern sense.10 
In al-Husri (and Michel Aflaq), we find all the ingredients characteristic of psycho-
nationalism that I have indicated with admittedly abstract brush strokes so far and that were largely 
absent in the writing of classical philosophers such as Ibn Khaldun: the nation is represented as the 
protective mother that Arabs need to honour and sacrifice for; love for the nation entices the 
individual to unite and fight for a better, utopian tomorrow; nationalism motivates “just” struggles 
and revolts; politics is configured as an arena of blood, sacrifice and honour; passion is presented as 
a potent psycho-cognitive force with an ideological edge11.In the words of al-Husri: ‘We must 
remember that the nationalist idea enjoys a self-motivating power; it is a driving impulse to action 
and to struggle. When it enters the mind and dominates the soul it is one of the motive ideas … 
which awakens the people and inspires them to sacrifice’12.The psychological elements are obvious 
here and they are far removed from anything Ibn Khaldun had to say about politics in general and 
asabiyyah in particular. Al-Husri is clearly constructing a psychologised narrative, dotted with 
anthropomorphic language, which is geared to create an anatomy of his idea of an Arab super-state. 
In a final ideological stroke which links his psycho-nationalism to the idea of a nation-state, al-Husri 
says: ‘When the language became the heart and spirit of the nation, then the people who spoke one 
language possessed one heart and a common spirit and therefore formed a nation. It then became 
necessary that they create one state’13. Ibn-Khaldun would have smiled at such an anti-philosophical 
definition of a nation and al-Husri was right, then, to see the difference between his stringent 
conceptualization of the Arab nation and the differentiated systems of community that Ibn Khaldun 
proposed 
If Ibn Khaldun is one of the forerunners of the idea of community, then Ferdowsi must be 
recognised as one of the icons of the eastern belles lettres. A supremely gifted poet, Ferdowsi 
finished the millennial book of kings in 1010 AD. Like Ibn Khaldun, Ferdowsi was concerned with 
society, politics, community, the rise and fall of empires etc. But his method was different. Ibn 
Khaldun spoke as a social scientist; Ferdowsi used the language of romance and poetry. Accordingly, 
the Shahnameh charts the history of Persia from pre-Islamic kingdoms to the Muslim conquest in 
the seventh century AD. From the perspective of European Orientalists, this emphasis on Iran’s pre-
Islamic heritage and his interest in using Persian (Farsi) as a literary medium was indicative of 
Ferdowsi’s aversion to Arabs and Islam in general14. Ferdowsi was wrongly portrayed as an early 
agitator against the Muslimisation of Iran in a grand effort to rescue a purified essence that was 
deemed distinctly Persian and anti-Arab.  
Orientalist themes played a major role in turning the Shahnameh into a psycho-nationalist 
trope for Iran’s nascent dynasties in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Persian grandeur always 
also has had an aestheticized component. The narratives that were invented around a seemingly 
coherent national identity, then, were professionally constructed. For instance, Persian language 
journals such as Kaveh and Iranshahr, which were published in Berlin by a group of influential 
                                                        
10 See further Nurullah Ardlc, ‘Genealogy or Asabiyya? Ibn Khaldun between Arab Nationalism and the Ottoman 
Caliphate’, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 71, No. 2 (2 October 2012), pp. 315–24. 
11 See further Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1997, p. 114. 
12 Quoted in William L. Cleveland, The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and 
Thought of Sati’ al-Husri, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 105, emphasis added. 
13 Ibid., p. 105. 
14 See further Alireza Asgharzadeh, Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, 
and Democratic Struggles, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
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Iranian intellectuals with a nationalist conviction, presented Ferdowsi as an icon of a unique and 
distinctive Iranian national identity. In particular Hassan Taqizadeh (1878–1969), the veteran 
activist of Iran’s Constitutional Revolt who edited Kaveh between 1916–22, superimposed western 
Orientalism on to the legacy of Ferdowsi. Highly influenced in his reading of Ferdowsi by Theodor 
Höldeke’s (1836–1930) ‘Das Iranische Nationalepos’ (the Iranian national epic), Taqizadeh 
famously proclaimed that Iranians had to embrace everything European wholeheartedly15. It was 
this Europeanised Seyyed, in Iran’s intellectual history, a lecturer at SOAS, University of London 
among other elite institutions, who was instrumental in inventing the Shahnameh as a source of 
Iranian national identity16. In true psychonationalist parlance, Taqizadeh argued that Ferdowsi was 
the one who ‘spun Iranian history and the national story into a perfectly structured narrative, and by 
establishing this narrative he has created one of the causes of glory for the Iranian nation and has 
preserved the national story until today’17. Taqizadeh uses a distinctly emotive and modern language 
in order to present the Shahnameh as a source of a purified national pride and consciousness. In this 
way, he is a psychonationalist par excellence and he should be read and understood in conjunction 
with Fichte, Herder, Mazzini, von-Ranke and others18. 
Undoubtedly, Ferdowsi was not indifferent to the politics of his day, not least because his 
livelihood was dependent on the patronage of the Ghaznavid court. As he concedes in the 
Shahnameh itself: when the poet comes to the Shah, ‘he cannot choose but sit before the throne’. 
Comparable to the tracts of Ibn Khaldun, there is a lot in the Shahnameh about the conduct in politics, 
community relations, humanity, governance, and identity centuries before scholars and poets in 
Western and Central Europe experimented with similar tropes. Yet it is central to my argument that 
the psycho-nationalist interpretations were superimposed. Neither Ibn Khaldun, nor Ferdowsi 
advocated worshipping the state and the nation. The hysterical emphasis on romance and love with 
reference to national sentiments is a typically modern project. A global reading of such historical 
junctures demonstrates that eastern modernities produced their own pioneers of such psycho-
nationalism. Iran is simply one example amongst many19. 
Moreover, in Ferdowsi, the “other” does not emerge as someone to be despised and subjugated, 
as psycho-nationalists would have it. The Shahnameh displays literary genius written in a 
cosmopolitan mode. Persia as a global effect, and an incubator of trans-regional culture, ideas that 
have had a long pedigree in Iran.  The idea that the book presents a manifesto of purely Iranian 
origin, undiluted by the vicissitudes of history, and an ideological manifesto against everything non-
Iranian is a modern fallacy. It is true that Ferdowsi glorified what he imagined to be Iranian culture, 
but the Shahnameh is rather more of a cultural festival than an ideological phalanx pointed against 
the non-Iranian world. As Dick Davies rightly points out in his extensive research about this subject: 
Ferdowsi also introduced what he considered to be non-Iranians who are portrayed in a positive 
light, such as women from all over Asia, in particular Sindokht, Rudabeh, Manizheh and Farigis.. 
In fact, all heroes of the Shahnameh have a mixed lineage and are far from purely ‘Iranian’ or 
‘Aryan’: the mother of the main protagonist, Rostam, is part Indian and part of demonic descent, 
                                                        
15 See further Hamid Dabashi, Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power in a Time of Terror, London: Transaction 
Publishers, 2009. 
16 See further Afshin Marashi, Nationalising Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870-1940, Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2008, pp. 123–25. 
17 Kaveh, 3rd October (new edition, no. 10), p. 12. 
18 Taqizadeh mingled with the ‘Orientalists’ of his day including A.J. Arberry and Walter Bruno Henning. He went 
on to chair several organisations in ‘Iranian Studies’. 
19 See further, Jack Goody, Renaissances: The One or the Many?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
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and the mothers of the princes Siyavash and Esfandiyar come from Central Asia and Rum (the 
Christian West) respectively. Therefore the Shahnameh is not ideologically cloistered, but rather a 
highly aesthetic manifestation of a global consciousness.  
Divested of psycho-nationalist ideology, the Shahnameh displays literal hybridity and 
aesthetic synergy rather than purity and difference. It narrates a ‘society that embodies constant 
internal contradictions; that has an extremely porous rather than simply oppositional relationship 
with surrounding cultures’20. The Shahnameh shows social life in its heterogeneous manifestations. 
‘If there is a unity to be found in these tales it is a unity of diversity, of disunity … rather than of a 
single geographic area, or of a single bloodline, or of a single tribe … or of a single religious 
tradition21. Persian culture, Hamid Dabashi recently wrote, is imbued with global thought and world 
culture22. Conversely, other doyens of ‘Iranian Studies’ such as the late Ehsan Yarshater are wrong 
to assume that ‘Iranian identity is clearly asserted in the inscriptions of Darius the Great (522–486 
B.C.) who as an Aryan and a Persian was fully conscious of his racial affiliation and proud of his 
national identity’23. It is problematic, typical and retroactive to assume that language carries identity, 
that Persian can ever be ‘the chief carrier of the Persian world view and Persian cultures’24. Indeed, 
I would go one step further and add that imagining an ‘original’ Iran has been the cardinal sin of 
contemporary Iranian history. As we will continue to find out, several depictions of Iran (or ‘Irans’) 
have been invented in accordance with political currents. There is no original identity to Iran. 
Originality is the standard parody that psycho-nationalists routinely display, in Iran and elsewhere. 
So the myths of a particularly Iranian or Persian identity were created within a historical 
context that was geared to psycho-nationalist currents, as demonstrated. Several studies have shown 
how in the twentieth century the Shahnameh was re-invented as a source for Iran’s psychonationalist 
project, which was intimately linked to imagining a nation ruled by a monarch represented by the 
Pahlavi dynasty. The Shahnameh as a psycho-nationalist trope was meant to function for the Pahlavi 
monarchs in at least two ways: first, it was thought to be functional in linking their legitimacy to the 
emperors of pre-Islamic Persia, and second to emphasise Iran’s difference to the ‘Semitic’ Arabs.  
From this perspective, Islam was deemed ‘other’ to Iran’s ‘true’ identity which was invented 
as Aryan, closer to Europe, even France as the Shah argued in 1963 in an article for Life magazine. 
Hence, a Shahnameh ‘industry’ emerged in Iran in the 1920s and 1930s, institutionalised in 
educational curricula in Iranian schools after the first Pahlavi monarch assumed power in 1925. 
Subsequently, building on ideas developed by Taqizadeh in the aforementioned Berlin-based 
journals Kaveh and Iranshahr, Reza Shah sponsored the newly established Society for National 
Monuments (anjoman-e asar-e melli) to build a mausoleum for Ferdowsi in Tus, located in north-
eastern Iran25. The architecture of the mausoleum reflects its political utility: it was built in the 
Achaemenidian style perfectly in tune with the penchant of the Pahlavi dynasty for pre-Islamic 
Persian empires. Uniformity in discourse facilitated uniformity in culture, which subdued the mosaic, 
                                                        
20 Dick Davies, ‘Iran and Aniran’, in Abbas Amanat and Farzin Vejdani (eds.), Iran Facing Others: Identity 
Boundaries in a Historical Perspective, London: Palgrave, 2012, pp. 46–7. 
21 Ibid. p. 47 
22 See further: Hamid Dabashi, The World of Persian Literary Humanism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2012. 
23 Ehsan Yarshater, ‘Persian Identity in Historical Perspective’, Iranian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1–2, 2007, 
p. 141. 
24 Ibid. p. 142. 
25 See further Afshin Marashi, ‘The Nation’s Poet: Ferdowsi and the Iranian National Imagination’, in 
Touraj Atabaki (ed.), Iran in the 20th Century: Historiography and Political Culture, London: I.B. Tauris, 
2009, pp. 93–111. 
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multicultural beauty of architectural designs in Iran. Furthermore, the farvahar, a Zoroastrian 
symbol central to the empire of Cyrus, satisfied the political quest to disassociate Iranian history 
and identity from Islam. Not entirely unlike the swastika which has been a prominent symbol in 
Hindu, Buddhist and Jainist religious folklore for millennia and which was then abused by the Nazis 
in Germany as a symbol for racial purity, the farvahar too travelled a long way from its neo-Assyrian 
habitat to Pahlavi Iran, where it was used as an emblem for Aryan/Persian purity. 
 
 
Psycho-nationalism and conflict 
 
The problem with the ideological underpinnings of psycho-nationalism is obvious: Indulging 
in the glory of “our” race or culture almost always entails the suppression of equal status for the 
race or culture that is represented as its other.  West Asia and North Africa are no exception.  Iranian 
and Arab identity politics thwarted, perverted, and dismembered communitarian thinking for long 
periods in the twentieth century and the same applies to other forms of psycho-nationalism in Turkey 
and Israel that I can’t explain here.  Today, some of the insidious legacies of psycho-nationalistic 
thinking are being resurrected throughout the region certainly in the hysterical narratives of the 
Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman who likened Iran to a Nazi state, to the detriment of 
symbiotic relations among the peoples of the region. 
     In Iran itself, psycho-nationalism was subdued as a part of the internationalism and 
emancipative message behind the revolution in 1979 which was hijacked and turned into a new 
discourse of hegemony constructed around a hybrid Shia-Persianised Islam that proclaimed a new 
form of ideological hysteria. And so psycho-nationalism survived and it is being actively resurrected 
as an expedient shortcut to gain the support of the resurgent bourgeoisie of Iranian society.  
Chauvinism against Arabs continues to guide the thinking of some Iranian commentators, especially 
in the Diaspora.  The latent powers of deeply internalized ideological constructs, it seems, do not 
disappear upon the demise of states based on them.  “Persianism” nurtured by the Pahlavis has 
outlived, in a modified form, the emancipative and internationalist momentum triggered by the 
revolution in 1979. 
     These antecedents of Iranian psycho-nationalism can be traced back to the writings of late 
nineteenth-century figures such as Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani and 
even before as I have argued elsewhere26. Demonstrating affinity with Orientalist views of the 
supremacy of the “Indo-European peoples” and the mediocrity of the “Semitic race,” Iranian 
psycho-nationalist discourse idealized pre-Islamic Persian empires, whilst negating the 
“Islamization” of Persia by Muslim forces. As I have argued above:  Iranian psycho-nationalism 
had its heydays during the Pahlavi dynasty.  The Shah’s decadent celebration of 2,500 years of 
Iranian empire in Persepolis in 1971 and his decision to abandon the Islamic solar hejra calendar in 
favour of an imperial one exemplify this adherence to the idea of “Persianism” and its anti-Islamic 
connotations. 
     By virtue of its psycho-nationalist ideology, Pahlavi Iran needed the “Arab other” to 
essentialize the Iranian self.  Distinguishing the “Iranian-Aryan” in-group from the “Arab-Semitic” 
out-group, political psychologists would point out, was achieved by emphasizing the superiority of 
the pre-Islamic Iranian heritage and undervaluing the Muslim identity of the majority of Iranians.  
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That failure to forge an inclusive identity was anathema to communitarian relations with Iran’s 
neighbours.  No wonder then that some Arab governments perceived the Shah’s aggressive military 
build-up under the patronage of the United States, claims to Bahrain that were dropped only after a 
plebiscite in the sheikhdom voted against unification with Iran, and the seizure of half of the Abu 
Musa island from Sharjah and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs from Rais al-Khaimah in 1971 as part 
of a grand strategy to “Iranianize” the area.  This might not have been the Shah’s ambition, but his 
adherence to a chauvinistic rhetoric gave all the wrong signals.  Ultimately, it widened the gulf 
between the peoples of the region and inhibited the institutionalization of a functioning regional 
security architecture — a necessary endeavour that has not been implemented to this day as I have 
argued in some of my earlier work27. 
     The development of psycho-nationalism as a part of state conduct in the Iranian context 
was comparable, albeit not identical, to the ideological evolution of Arab psycho- nationalism.  
Whilst the Iranian variant during the Pahlavi era showed closed affinity with French notions of Indo-
European supremacy most forcefully elucidated by Ernest Renan, the branch of Arab psycho-
nationalism developed by al-Husri and institutionalized in the Ba’th (rebirth) party by Michel Aflaq 
was closer to the tradition of German romanticism.  Following Johann G. von Herder’s idea of a 
Kulturnation, that is, a cultural community transcending the confine of the state (the idea later 
developed by Johann Gottlieb Fichte), al-Husri, as we have established in the previous section, 
advocated the view that the “Arab umma” was a cultural nation held together by a common national 
language and shared common folklore. 
     So, like Pahlavian psycho-nationalism, which developed insidiously racist narratives 
during periods of crisis, the Arab variant too, gave birth to its own abominations.  Nowhere was the 
process of psycho-nationalistic radicalization of Arabism more pronounced than in Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq where anti-Iranianism (next to anti-imperialism and anti-Semitism) became a central 
ideological pillar of the Ba’thist state.  Pamphlets such as Khairallah Talfah’s Three Whom God 
Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews and Flies, books such as Ta’rikh al-hiqd al-Farsi ‘ala al-
‘Arab [The History of Persian Hatred of the Arabs], serials entitled Judhur al-‘ada al-Farsi li-l-umma 
al-‘Arabiyya [The Roots of Persian Hostility toward the Arab Nation], and proverbs such as Ma 
hann a’jami ‘ala ‘Arabi [An ajam, or Persian, will not have mercy on an Arab] repeatedly depicted 
Iranians as cruel and merciless, the ultimate bearers of shu’ubyya possessed by a “destructive 
Persian mentality” (aqliyya takhribiyya).  The myth was created that hatred towards Arabs was an 
integral part of the Persian character and that this racial attribute had not changed since the days of 
the Islamization of the Sassanian empire in the seventh century AD.   No wonder then that Saddam 
Hussein ordered the establishment of the “Arab Gulf Office” in 1977.   By disseminating maps 
designating the Gulf as Khaliji Basra (the Gulf of Basra) or al Khalij al-‘Arabi (the Arab Gulf), 
Saddam Hussein claimed a prominent role in the region, appealing to (Iraqi-centric) Arab nationalist 
sentiments with anti-Iranian precepts. Some of these racist sentiments towards Iranians can be easily 
discerned until today, especially in the pamphlets of terror movements such as ISIS or al-Qaeda. 
     The phenomenon of psycho-nationalist discourse in Iran and Iraq sketched here is an 
example of the invention of nations and nation-states examined by Ernest Gellner and Eric 
Hobsbawm among others.  (Psycho-)nationalism was a means to mobilize the support of the 
populace and a symbol of legitimacy for the authoritarian regimes in power.  In order to manufacture 
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salient state identities, differences were accentuated and commonalities underplayed, hardening the 
invented self-other dichotomy between the peoples of the region Iranians and Arabs, but also Turks, 
Kurds and/or Israelis.  At the peril of abstraction we can say that in all contexts, psycho nationalism 
has served political ends that proved to be anathema to regional cohesion and harmony.  For Iranian 
psycho-nationalists, representation of the “Arab other” was perverted in order to herald Iran’s 
distinctiveness and the country’s “natural” affinity with the “West.”  Arab psycho-nationalism, on 
the other hand, was invoked as a political strategy to exclude Iran from the arena of inter-Arab 
politics. The politics of identity, then, created a regional system imbued with insecurity and recurrent 
conflict. 
 
After psycho-nationalism: Therapies for the future 
 
In the lived reality of the peoples of the region and beyond, national narratives are never 
immutable; they are impure, creolised phenomena, porous and polluted spaces that are open to 
interpretive manipulation. In order to govern that reality, psycho-nationalisms are socially 
engineered to simulate uniformity and positive distinction from the “other”. In this sense, psycho-
nationalism is a border creating device, it is meant to create “iron walls” staffed by intolerant 
gatekeepers (e.g. the planned wall between the United States and Mexico and the separation wall 
between Israel and the West Bank). In its most extreme manifestation psycho-nationalism provokes 
distinctly fascist politics. In Apartheid South Africa and in Israel among the right wing, it has 
informed policies of separation and oppression. And in continental Europe today, it is challenging 
the idea of the European Union in the name of an anti-immigration agenda – borders are re-staffed, 
barbwires rolled out and fences are being put up. The resurgence of the politics of identity 
spearheaded by Geert Wilders, Nigel Farage and Marine Le Pen is a strong contemporary indicator 
of the dangers of psycho-nationalism. The so-called ‘Left’ is trapped in ideological controversy that 
merely proclaims a counter-identity, admittedly more optimistic, but without a great leap towards a 
politics of radical federal democracy that empowers citizens and communities rather than the central 
state. 
And yet, as I have tried to demonstrate in On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian Revolution, 
any effort to separate the ‘self’ from the ‘other’ creates a very particular form of interdependence, a 
“disjunctive synthesis” that does not yield neatly delineated identities28. Thus, representations of 
“self” and “other” are entirely interdependent even when they are geared towards antagonistic 
politics. The deeply dialectical history of this region and its hybrid ethnic and cultural make-up 
provides many historical examples for this reality. It is exactly because of this ancient hybridity that 
psycho-nationalism, even if in its most horrific manifestation, never really subdued a common 
regional spirit and humanity amongst the majority of the people living in West Asia and North 
Africa. Iranians may have parodied seemingly divergent identities with their significant others – 
Arabs, Europeans, Americans – aimed at setting themselves apart as a separate and authentic 
“nation”, but their performative acts achieved the opposite. By allocating to the other side a 
prominent discursive presence, the interdependence between the national narratives suggesting “an 
Iran” are now entirely dependent on the ideational territory presumed to be beyond those imagined 
confines. In other words, Iran’s significant “others” are now subsumed in the meaning of Iran. The 
                                                        
28 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian Revolution: Power and Resistance Today, London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013. 
 The myth of “national identity”: Psycho-nationalism in Iran and the Arab world 
   
       63 
 
IDE ME Review Vol.7 
©IDE-JETRO 2020 
same applies to the “Arab” space which is entirely interspersed by its significant others: Turks, 
Iranians, even Israelis. Moreover, this creolised space is lived on a daily basis throughout the region 
in cosmopolitan centres such as Beirut, Doha, Dubai, Tehran or Istanbul. The lived reality in the 
region is a constant therapeutic anti-dote to the psycho-nationalism of the states, and within the right 
historical context it could be a panacea to the crisis of governance throughout the region. The Arab 
revolts, despite their limited success in terms of “good governance” to date, were a beginning to that 
end.   
       It is true, as Asef Bayat argues, that daily “anti-order” practices and activities such as 
setting up ‘illegal’ street businesses in main squares, squatting in public parks and tourist hubs or 
challenging moral sensitiveness through provocative dress, have always been part and parcel of 
public life in the region and beyond29. But these “non-movements” are decisively morphed into a 
political upheaval during revolts exactly because the anarchic, daily actions that questioned public 
order are suddenly coordinated and enriched with political symbols and imagery that promise a 
better future for the people. Under the pressure of such an event, daily routines that rupture public 
order transform into active detachment from the demands of the state: The street vendor marches to 
the public square to demonstrate; the squatters set up camps with the help of organised student 
movements; and housewives sabotage infrastructure as a part of a grand strategy to overcome the 
oppression of society. In other words, daily dissent transmutes into a revolt with transversal 
capability that challenges both established norms within society (horizontal movement) and the truth 
conditions held up by the state and the normative order of the international system (vertical 
movement). The revolts in Tunisia and Egypt which heralded the “Arab Spring” in 2010, despite of 
the subsequent disappointments, were exactly multi-dimensional in this sense.  
    Second, until Tunisia and Egypt erupted, the dominant narrative in the western media was 
that Arab and Muslim societies are beset by radicalism and that al-Qaida is a viable political force. 
In the 21st century, the fight against “Muslim radicalism” (or what Bernard Lewis infamously called 
“Muslim rage”) has seen huge resources allocated to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; to the regime-
change strategy in Iran, Lebanon and Gaza; and to huge military budgets and many national-security 
papers. With the Arab revolts, a deep transformation exposed the failures and follies of this approach.  
The uprisings in the Arab world and beyond were a key agent of this process of renewal. More 
recently the demands for democracy and social empowerment engendered mass movements in 
Sudan, which helped to topple “President” Omar al-Bashir, who had ruled the country for over three 
decades. Similarly, in Algeria, protesters prevented Abdelaziz Bouteflika from seeking yet another 
term in office, a major achievement for the democracy movement in the country. 
These are the anti-dotes to psycho-nationalism that continue to permeate the civil societies in 
the region. They have proven to be exemplary for other resistance movements all over the world  
     As a way of summarising my argument: In today's ideational tapestry of West Asia and 
North Africa there is quite literally no intellectual and geographic space that imagined communities 
such as  Jews, Turks, Iranians, Palestinians, Arabs, Christians, Berbers, Muslims, Copts, Kurds, 
might claim for themselves in total independence from the neighbour. In the nomadic spaces of 
West Asia and North Africa, in EurAsia Eurasia more generally, and indeed in an increasingly 
interconnected world, the neighbour is immanent to the self; waging war against her is always also 
an act of self-harm. The 21st-century reality is that peace cannot be safeguarded on a national or 
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“civilisational” basis, and that the only option to ensure peace is to make a viable neighbour policy  
a priority. This is at the heart of the concept of human security, as opposed to state security – a 
commitment to world peace rooted in respect and tolerance between peoples. The security threats 
emanating from the global system require a strategy that moves beyond notions of territoriality and 
psycho-nationalist cohesion, and embraces as far as possible a contra-identarian and humanistic 
approach to international affairs. To these ends, emphasising and then moving beyond the linkages 
between “us” and “them” rather than any supposed opposition is vital. Both a new generation with 
a global mindset, and members of minorities expressing ideas from outside the mainstream, are well 
placed to contribute to this process. In many ways they are proof that for a long time, and without 
realising it, we have been living in the end times of divisive ideologies based on racial designations 
or geographic “origin”. To move against psycho-nationalism does not mean to stop loving your 
culture. For example, being overwhelmed by the texture and taste of Japanese food or the beautifully 
arched curves framing the Zen temples of Kyoto is not psycho-nationalistic. But if these 
manifestations of a hybrid Japanese culture are used to denigrate others as ingredients of a pure, 
one-dimensional Japan, as Iranian psycho-nationalists misused the Shahnameh, then we are 
devaluing the impact of various cultures on Japanese architecture and cuisine. In that case, truth 
would be discarded for ideology, and antagonism towards the “other” would be rather more likely. 
Once we cast psycho-nationalism aside, we get closer to “our” interdependent truth, which is the 
only source of authenticity in this world. At that stage, we can be at peace with “us”, and “them” 
and the smiling face of the “other” appears as the mirror image of our “self”.  
